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INITIATIVES FAILI~D:
ELI~CTORAL TRENDS AND
TBE FEMALE VOTE

WilY

TBI~

Matthew Holland
Three things seemed likely to Utah voters in the
early summer of 1HHH: Michael Dukakis would be
t.heil' next Prcsident, Ted Wilson would be their next
Governor, and the 1!IHH Utah lax initiatives wOllld
puss wit.h overwhelming support. But on NovemlJl'r
R, 1HHR, I}ukakis was glad he had a job in Boston,
Wilson oncl'ed congratulations to a surprised Norm
Bangertel', and 11ll' initiatives wen' dd'eatl'd by the
sallle margin with which they were originally
favort'd to pass, Then~ has heen, and will continue
to be, considerahle discussion about the upsets of
I}ukakis and Wilson, but few are asking, "What
happened to the initiatives?" Some answers to that
qucstion can be dl'lt'nnined by analyzing the current
theOl'ics about the politil's of dired legislation,
considering some nl'W n~sl'ar('h on demographic
factors that influenced this year's initiative cledion,
and studying the various campaign tactics both sides
used on this isslle,
To place an initiative on the ballot, Utah Slate
law I'cquircs that a petition be submitted with a
number of signal ures equaling ten percent of I he
voLe fiJI' the last gubernatorial cll'l'Iion in I wo-thii'ds
of the count.ies. According 10 this formula, proposed
petitions for the 1!IHH ballot needed ahollt six ty
thousand signatures, Last spring Ihrl'e initiatives - A, n, and C -- wen' submilll'd wit h the necessary
endorscmel)ts. Initiativl' A was a tax and spending
limitatioll whidl would havc 10werl'd\limited property
Laxes. Initiative B ,would have n·dul't'd income taxes
and the Laxes Oil sail'S, motor flll·l. and tobalTo 10
I mHi levels.
Initiativl' C would have given tax
credit. to parents who want.ed 10 scnd tlwir childrcn
to private sdlOols.
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In .J line I !lHH a KS L\J)/,s..,.1'l NelliS poll ('(muuclt,d
by Dall .Jolles and Associatt's (lll'l'eal't.el' I'cli.~rreu t.o
as the .Jones poll) reported that. !)ti'~" of Utah
residents (not Ill'l'('ssal'ily I'egish~red votel'~) favol't'd
Initiative A, 2:~% opposl'd ii, and 21'/1, were
IIndt'ciued. An:ol'uing to Ihe .Jom's poll, Initiative B
h,\(J the hest chance of winning: !)H'~;, said they wel't~
in favor, :~·t% were OPllosl'd, and !t% were
IIIHIt'l'idmJ.
TIll' public sl't'lIll'd less t'lIthlisiast ic
ahout Initiatin' C, hut il was slill favoreu to pass,
with a margill of !) I'~;, for, II"" against, anu ~I%
undecided.
The qllestion as 10 why the initialives failed after
starting wilh sllch gl'eal support is further
complicated by an examination of the aUiludes of
the Utah electorate the day of the election.
Aceording t.o the KBY U Ulah Colleges Exit poll
(hereaflcr referred to as the K BY U poll) conduded
the day of the election by Drs. David Magleby and
lIoward Christensen of Brigham Yollng 1I niversity,
(i I % of vot.ing LJ tahns believed pl'opert.y taxes were
too high, only 2~1.!)% helieved taxes were about
right., and a smattering of others either 'cit they
were too low 01' did not have an opinion.
The KBY U poll indicated at least 40% of the
vot.ers in Utah lelt "tax cut.s were good 101' other
st.at.es," :uvv" disagl'eeu wit.h that. stat.ement. and 2H%
did not know.
Result.s of the poll also showed a
vast majorit.y of the voting public -- ~)2IYt, -- believed
there was at least "some" to a "great deal" of
wast.e in Ulah governmenl.
Probably the major
argument. of the groups support.ing the init.iatives
was thal I his legislal ion was needed because
burcaueI'ats were squandering public funds.
Some lIa ve tried t.o /~x plain t.he defeat of the
1I111lalive prol'ess. 1I0wevel', the KBYU poll seems
to disprove thal theory.
A question 011 t Ill' poll
(it'linl'd tlH' PI'OC!!SS as one when~ "cit.iZI'IlS call writl'
laws whieh volers can n·j(~t'I. 01' pass thus hypassing
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the legislature," alld asked votl~rs how they f'elt
ahoul. it.. A dl~ar majority -- li!i% of tilt' voters in
Ulah
felt the illitiative process W,\S a "good
lhing," only I~% thought it was a "had thing," H%
said it made "110 differellce" and I :1 11., said t hey "did
not know."
Despile these gelleral altitudes that the process
is good, t.axes are 1~10 high, there is waste in
government, and tax cut.s wcre good for other
stales, two-t.hirds of Utah voters cast ballots against.
the tax initiatives, To determine why the initiatives
failed in Ute midst of circumstances that seemed so
favorable to their passage IIIIl' should probably start
with a brief study of the current hypothesis about
voting behavior on direct legislation.
Dr. David
Magleby, professor of Politi(:al Seience and Public
Opinion at Brigham YOllng University, has done
extensive research and writing on t.he t.opic or direct
legislation. I will identify several determinants that
Dr. Mugleby suggests influem:e t he vole on ballot
propositions and show how lJtah's I HHH initiativc
election and campaign support his thesis.
Fit'st of all, "therc is a predidable movement
from general support for the propo::;it ion in t.he carly
campaign to its r~iection as the campaign procceds"
(Magleby I IlH·., 170). Profcssor M aglt·by 's reasoning
is that at. the start. of the campaign "mo::;t voters
at'e willing to state a prefl'n!Il('l~ for or against. a
proposition evcn if they know very lillie aboul it"
(I !lH4, 170). Thcrcfore an issuc that is currently
populut, -- like lax cuts -- has all early appcal but
in time as t.he campaign moves on and Ihe
short.comings and problcms of the initiative become
more and more evidcnl, suppo .... wanes. The I !)HH
init.iat.ives in Utah I'ollowl'd Ihal nalural trend of
carly appeal, followed by sleadily decreasing support
which is charadcrist ic or most initiatives.
Part. of the reason 1'01' sm:h a high frequcncy of
"lIlind-change" 011 tilt' issuc is hl~l',Hlse volers on
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proposit.ions telld to he "less SlIl'l' 01' their volin~
intentions, less knowledgealJle ahout. t Ill' proposition
eontl'sts, and probably 1lI0rl' suset'Jlt ihle 10 campaign
appeals" (Magleby ImH, 17'2).
As a result they
usually vote for the side "that spends the most
money" (Magleby 1 HK4, 145), is "endon;ed by the
media elite" (Magleby IUK4, 145), and "hest defines
the issue"(Maglehy I HH4, I (iR).
Mickey Gallavin,' an advertising consultant with
lIarris and Love Inc.\Advertisin~ hired by Tax
Payers for Utah (the group which mobiliZl'd to
defeat the init.iat.ives), estimat.es that approximately
$:I!)U,()()() was spent. 011 the campaign against the
initiatives. Mills C.'enshaw, a local .-adio talk show
host and leading member 01' the Tax Limitation
Coalition
(which
I'ought liJr
passage or the
initiatives), estimatl's theil' group probably spent
around $!)(),()()().
These ligures vary somewhat
depending on the SOlUTe of inlill'mation, but it is
safe to say that the anti-initiative group out.spent
the proponents 01' the initiatives by at least three to
one.
Tax Payers ('or Utah almost had a monopoly on
media and e1it.e endorsement.s. Ac{"ording to Mickey
Gallavin, t.he campaign st.rategy was that each week
a well known public figure in Utah representing a
particulat' OI'ganization
would
make a
public
announcement in opposition to the initiatives.
Republican Senator O .... in Ilatch, fonner Democratic
Governor Scott. Mat.heson, Salt. Lake County Slwrilf
Pete Hayward and a host 01' ot.her visible Utahns
discouraged other Utahns to vote li,r t.he initiatives.
The only noticeable public ligure ellliorsements ror
the initiatives were ('rom the ahove mentioned Mills
C"cnshaw and
MelTill Cook, Ihe Independent
candidale for Govprnol'. Neit.her ('(luld he ('onsiliered
two of t.he more conspicuous eilizl'ns of the slale.
The principal news media in till' stall' -- the SuLt
[,u/w '/'riblllw, lhe /).'s.!ld News, the ()Md.'/1 S((I//l/unl
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/':xamilla, KSL television and radio, and KlJTV
television -- all publidy took a positioll ill oppositioll
to the initiatives.
The only media publication to
come out. wit.h an edit.orial opinion in support. of the
initiatives, acconJing t.o Mickey Gallavin, was a
newspaper in Manti, Utah. The amount of money
spent, the quality and quantity of media opposition
and the number of elit.e endorsements were
undoubtedly keys to the success in defeat.ing t.he
initiatives.
According to findings from the KBYU poll, the
opponents of the initiatives also did a Let\.er job at
"defining the issue," and the side which can do that
"usually wins" (Magleby I !lH4, WR).
Seveml
themes from hoth sidl'S were publicized as a way of
defining the issue.
The Tax Limitation Coalition
group accused the government of wast.e and
mismanagement, which the KBYlJ poll showed most
people agreed with to some degree. Their cOl'OlIat,y
to this accusation was that because there is so
much wast.e, tax cuts would streamline the
government and improve the l'l'()JlOmy.
Tlwrl'fill'e
"prosperity follows tax cut.s."
According t.o the
KBYLJ exit poll, 4()% of the voters Lelil~ved that
idea but 471lhl did not.
Those fighting the initiatives realized that thl'
majority of the electorat.e fClt tax cuts in gl'lleral
were needed.
Deciding they could not. win by
sllggesting tax cut.s per se would be damaging t.o
Utah, t.hey pushed the theme that perhaps some
kind of t.ax cuts wt'rt' Ill'ct'ssary but thest' "artieular
init.iatives "go too ra..... TIll' KBY U poll illdi('ated
that. ():~(Ytl, of the volers lIl,lil'veti this Ihellw whilt'
:~ I % did not.
Perhaps ol'l'uuse or (or at least ill
addition to) their ability to outspend alld gathcr
",on' visible support thall their OPPOIll'lltS, those
working to dl'rl'at till' illitiativl's were ilion' drl'l'Iivc
ill convinl'ing the public or thcir poillt or vicw.
These theories, rads and ligures illllieale a few
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of the reasons the initiatives failed in I HHH.
Ilowever, results from the .Ioncs and KBYU polls
suggest that there were abo some important
demographic fadors which influenced this election,
the most. notahle of which was gender.
in .June
I HHH the .Jones poll showed that only I 7 (I/" of
women were planning to vot.e against Initiative A
while :w'y" of men indicated they would vote against
it.. Ilowevel', on NovemLwr 5, I !lHH, just three days
before the election, (iH% or women, a decisive
majority, said they would che(:k a "No" on the
initiatives and fl7% of men anticipat~~d they would
vote "No" as well. This means that women voting
against the initiatives increased by !)O% whereas
male ::HIpporl for the proposit.ions increased by 17%.
This pattern was consistent on all three initiatives,
hut it was more cvidcnt on A and B than it was
on
C.
The youngt~1'
voters (ages
I H-:H)
demonstrated a similar phenomenon comparcd to the
older age groups (although the rrequency or change
was not as substantial as it was ((II' women, it was
still significant),
It is also interesling to noll' Ihat the .Joncs poll
showed thai demographics like inCllme, party
affiliation, ideology and education
which are
usually the most importanl influelH:es on voting
hehavior -- did not make mUl'h difference on the
initiat.ive vote.
In 01 her words, in .J une I !lHR a
roughly equal majorit.y of' hoth Repuhlicans and
Democrats, conservatives and liherals, those who
madc over $liO,OO() a year and those who make
$20,(HIO, and college graduate:,; and Ihose with all
eighth grade (~ducation werc planning to vote fill'
the initiatives. In Noveml,cr I !IHH the samc gmups
we.·c cqually oppo:,;ed to thc h~gislation. Why sueh
a disparity, then, betwcI!n 1llt.'1! and wOlllcn on thi:,;
issue?
This qucst.ion delllonslra"~s t.he utility of
puhlic opillion polls. With data 1'1'1110 Ihe KBYLJ poll
it is possi""~ to ex amillc I hc similaritics alld
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differences or the influences on the voling Leha viol'
of Lolh men and women.
According lo lhe K BY LJ poll, (i4% of male voters
fell lhey paid a great deal of attention to lhe
initiatives and '(iti'Y" of women said they did as well.
Thus men and women were equally attentive to t.he
issue. An exad parity·· 4!1% -- of both male and
female voters, said they felt that the tax cuts woulo
make intrusions into state services.
Men and
women were fairly equal in how mud) they thought
about. the initiatives; 2H% of men saio they lhoughl
a great deal about the legislation and 2:l% or
women said they did too,
Bolh men and women
agreed thal lelevision and nl!WSpaper were their
most important SOlIITes of information on the
initiatives.
It lleems that neither sex was quicker
t~) make up their mind; nlughly an equal Illlmlll'r or
men and women madc up their minds on how tlll'Y
would vole on the initiatives a month before the
e1eelion.
Despite these many similarities, women differed
fnlln men on several ideological stances, on Ihe way
t.hey gat.hered information ami on the way Ihey
were influenced by t.he various themes of the
campaign.
According to t.he poll a greater
percentage of women would he willing t.o pay taxes
to help finance higher wages for teachers, Figures
show t.hal. 5 I % of women would support. a t.ax
inCl'ease for teachers' wages while just 42% of men
would favor' such an increase, It is possible -- ano
would be worth st.udying -- that. in LIlah more men
t.han women pay tlw taxes ('(II' their family and as
a result would tend to he more conservative in what
t.hey agree 1.0 raise laxes for. Perhaps women have
a stronger maternal\dollll'stic instind. ano issues like
eoucation for t.heir l'hildren are slightly ilion'
important. t.o t.hem than they are to mcn, Whatever
t.he motivation, till' idt'a or ('ulting boll'k on education
to save 1lI0W'y dot'S nol appt'al to WOlllt'1l as llIut'h
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as it dm's to nH'n,
()lIly 2!1'I" of wornl'n t hOIl~ht
that elllTl'nt fllnding for cdll!"al iOIl shollid Ite nIt or
stay the Hallle whereas ·lIi% or 1lll'1l felt slIch cuts
would he appropriate. AH far as a possihle illlTcase
in SPCIHlilig for education was ("olll'erned" (il% or
women would have HII\lporlcd it whilc only ,j 7% of
thc mall' votl' advocated Hudl a step.
Womt'll were slight Iy leHs t rllsting of the initiat.ive
pn)('eHH than ml'n. About. (i I % of women It,ll. that.
dire{'\, legislation was a good thing compared 1.0 HH%
or tnen who felt. it was a good thing.
It would
Heelll logical thaI. I.hoHe who diHtrust. t he initiative
pnlcess would tend io vot.e againHt. the initiatives.
If t.his is the case it would inlluenl'e morc women
than men.
While lhe majority of both men and women
claimed t.hat lelevision and nCWHpaperH were 1IICil'
beHt sources of infonnalion on the initiatives, onethird of the women polled said that their mOHt
important. source of jnlill'lllation was word of mouth
or some other source hesides television, radio,
newspaper, or voleI' pamphlet. Only I S% of men
said that word of mouth or another Hource was their
best SOUlTe of inlilrmation. The signilicanw of theHe
stat.istics becomes even more evident in light of the
campaign strategy of those opposing t.he initiatives.
As I mentioned belill'e, the side that. defines the
iSHue lhe best usually wins .. nd t.he, ant,i-initiatives
grouJl was the lIlost sUl'Cl'ssful in convincing the
puhlic of t.heir point of view. The KBYll poll shows
t.hat t.he t.hernes behind the campaign IiII' t.he
initiatives were less inlluent.ial than t.he themes their
opponents used; fw,thennore, t.he campaign lill' the
initiativeH was particularly illdledivl' with WlIIlll'n.
One of the themes the proponents of t.he
initiatives desperatl'ly t.ried to drive home was t.hat
"pnlsperity lill\ows tax clltS." This idea went. OVl~r
fairly well wit.h men, 47% or whom aglw,d lhat a
redul'l.ion in taxes would fud the economy.
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lIowever, only ~!I'Yt, of the WOIJH'n thal voted were
convinced proHperit.y would come from tax cutH and
1H% said they "did not know," whereas just H% of
men were undecided.
This is perhaps another
indidment against the eflccliveness of the initiative
campaign; they failed to eonvince a significant bloek
of undecided voLers of their posilion. On many of
the themes there is a highcr rat.e of indccision
among women than lIlen. Ill'. Magleby suggest t.hat
where doubt or decision lurk, t.here is a greater
tendency to vole against the initiatives and maintain
the st.atus quo (I HH4).
Another question on t.he KBYll poll asked lhe
voter if they felt Utah schools were doing a good
job. The advocates of the initiatives felt that if the
voters could be convinccd that Utah schools were
doing a good job t.hl'n cut.s in funding would not
seem so critical. Certainly few people would vote
fOl' cuts if they felt t.hal Utah schools were doing
a bad job and la{~ked the funds to improve. Almost
11% more men than women felt that Ut.ah schools
were doing a good joh. Both men and women were
about equal on the "don '(. know" response.
Anothe,' point the '!',IX Limitation Coalition t.ried
to put across was thal "t.ax cuts were good for
other states," believing that if t.hey could convince
the voLers of this the initiatives would pass. Again,
more men than wOlllen agreed with t.his idea by a
margin of 44% t.o :1:1% respeclively.
A message the Coalition probably should ha ve
used more ext.ensively, but for some reason did !lot,
was that "tax cuts send a message to governlllent.."
This would have bCl'n an errcclive argullll'nt because
it would have pulled debate away filnn whether or
not these particular init.iatives wen' good or bad and
moved it toward general l'OIHwnsus t.hat t.axes -particularly higlll'r laxes -- arl' unacceptable to the
vot.ing Jlublic.
Even wit.h till' meager attempts of
t.he Coalition to put this iill'a across 10 till' public,
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54 11., of men agreed with it.. WOlllen were not quit.e
so sure the cuts would send such a message; only
:17% thought that it would and 2 IIYt, (versus 10% of
the male vote) were undccitlcd.
The single most eflcl'i ive campaign slogail or t.his
campaign -- which happened to be generated by the
opposition -- was t.hat t.he initiatives "go too fa .... ;
():!ty', of the de('(orate agret~d wit h t.hat statemenL
This was also t he only theme that. womcn helieved
more t.han men hy a rate of (i5% to ()O%.
It is
also interest.ing t.hat. this was one of t.hc fcw issucs
whe .. e both men alld womell wen' well decided; vel'y
few of either scx checked the "don't know" response.
Compared to the proponents of the initiatives, t.he
opponents did a mm'h betler job at persuading the
puhlic -- and partkularly women -- from an opposing
01' unde('ided point. of view to t heir position.
These data from the KB Y U poll indicate that in
Utah, women seemed t~) have different attitudcs
from men about spending and education, oftcn
received their information from different sources than
men did, and were more convinced by the antiinitiatives I hemes and less convinced by the proinitiative t.hemes than men were. Why'!
According t.o consultant Mickey (;allavin, those
working to defeat the initiatives "f()cused their
campaign on wOlnen."
lie said that. lhe rcason f(u
doing so was because polls showed that "most people
defined this as an education issue more than
any thing dse, and that women were generally more
cOrleerned wilh education t.han men,"
Because at
the st.art of the campaign more WOIlll'n t.han men
w(~n~ voting f(II' t.he initiatives, and res(~arch showed
t his legi~:;\atiorl was hping illtcl'pl'l'Il'd as an education
isslle (which womell can'd aboul ilion' than men),
the opponents saw t.hat female vole as large and
o

winilabll~,

Tlw first stl'P in Iheir opposition H/,.all'~.Y,
according to (:allavin, was t.o g('1 ev('ry orgalli/.alioll
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that. woultl be al'('eded hy Ihese culs -- from Project
2()()() lo lhe Chamber of COllllnen:e -- to publicly
announce their opposition to the iniliatives and join
forces with Tax Payers of Utah to defeat them.
Three of the largest and most promillellt groups
they enlisled were the Parenl-Teaclwr Associalion
(PTA), lhe Utah Education Association (lJ EA), and
the League of Women Voters, all three of which arc
p.·edominanily female.
(~allavin said his research
showed that if tlleY could gel !)()l)'r, of their own
constituents, many of which were female, I hey could
defeat lhe initiatives. By striving to win the votes
of t.he members of these organizations t.hey were
focusing on female vot.ers.
The next big push, and according 10 Gallavin the
mosl effective, was the two-pronged ef'('ort of the
PTA. Their lirst project. was to hreak every city
up iniAl precinds and assign each member to a
certain precind, where they would visit every home
at Icast two or three times unlil Ihey spoke to
someone face to face.
Starting al Ihl' end of
August and coni inuing right up I hrough ('led ion day,
these PTA members, anned wilh pill'S or pamphlets
and the powers of persuasion, Ill'gan t.o visit each
home in their precincts to convince people of Ihe
damage they thought would he dOlle 10 educatioll in
Ut.ah if the initiat.ives passed. Though Ihis is not.
conclusive, it would seelll prohable Ihat. be("ausl~ the
majority of PTA IlwllIlH'rs arl' women alld because
womcn are gellCrally llIore fl'l'l' alld lll'xil,le during
t.he day, woml'1I would be goillg t.o hOllsl' 10 housl'
during Ilw dilY alld probahly speakillg 10 wOllwn
thai were home durillg till' ddY. This, howl'ver, is
only conjectllre.
The PTA's lH'xl t.adic was 10 dl'vole lIll'ir
regularly allolled pori ion of I illll' on "Back -To-School
Nighl'" t.o inli,nnal ion ahout the inil ial ivl's.
Each
PTA n'JlI'l·sent.alivl~ was illslrllcll'd nol 10 Iell
pan'nt.s how 10 vole 011 Ihl' illitialives hilt. 10 illform
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till' parcnts as al'l:uratcly as they l'ould how t.hat.
partil'ular school would Ill' alfet'h'd by t.hese lax
cuts. Support.crs or t.he init.iat ives wt'rt' givl'll -- anti
encouragl'd t.o t.ake -- equal tillle t.o present. t.heir
point. or view. Sotnetimes this led t.o very heat.ed
dehat.l', Lut. more oftcn t.han not., says - Mickey
Uallavill, t.he pro-illit.iative J)pople railed to make an
appearance or give an adequate argullll'nt at. t.hese
meetings.
Though st.atistics are 1I0t. availaLle, it
would prohahly be a sale anti important. assumption
10 say thai mon' woml'1I I hall ml'1I atl.t'nd the
"Baek-To-Sdwol Night" sponsored by t.he PTA each
rail.
The hypot.hesis that thesc effort.s direetly all'eeted
wotnpn more than tnl'n is pari ially supported by the
fact, as was tnenliOlll'd l'arlil'r, th,lt. according to the
KBY 1I poll womell wen' pt'rsll:Hlt'd by word ot'
tnouth or anotlll'r SOUITe mon' Ihan ml'll. Cl'rtainly
t.he efforts 01' till' PTA would fall umler eit.her of
those categories.
That t.he campaigning of t Ill' PTA h,I(1 a
significant. impa('t on volers IS powt'll'ully confirmed
by till' .Jont'S tra('king poll. .Ionl's's poll shows that
through most of the sumnwl· monl hs support Ii,.· t.he
init.iat.ives dcdincd, but it was a vcry, very gradual
dedinc.
Using Initiativc A as an example, in the
Lt'ginning of .June I !tHH flli% of the electorate
favol"l'd it and only 2:\% opposcd it. By tlw end of
August I !tHR support had only dipped to about. r,:\ly"
and opposition had only risen one or two points.
1I0wever, between the end of August and OdAILel·
I H, I !IHH (only seven or eighl wecks), support
sagged t.o 4(J1,Y" while opposition skyrocketed t.o 4!1%.
Though perhaps less dramat it-, I he vot ing hchaviOl·
on t he other two initialiv('s dt'lllonst rated similar
phellOmPlla (sel' Table A -- .Jont's poll).
In other
words, from t.he start t.he initial ivl's gradllally lost
support but something happellcd ill btl' August 0 ..
early September to begin 1.0 change dramatit'all.v tlil'

WilY 'I'1I14~ INITIATIVI·~S FAILED 1:1
aUit.ude of' Ut.ah voll'l~ ahoul. the lJIiliative~. It W.1S
t.he last week in August when Ute PTA started their
door-to-door campaigning and it was in the middle
of September wlll'n lIark -To-School Nights began.
An additional evidl'nct' that these initiatives were
most. effectively del"eall·d by the work of the PTA
is t.hat memllt'rs of the Tax Limitat.ion Coalit.ion who
sponsored t.he It'gislat ion dailTl I hat the PTA's ef"fi,,'ls
arc what did them ill. In a conversation wilh Mills
Crenshaw, he said, "We did 1I0t have the money or
t he resources the 0111\'1' group had hut. what really
killed liS were I hc Back-To-School Nights" (Deccmhl'r
Ifi, IHHH).
Undouhtedly the PTA's efforts had a
significant impact on the elcctorate.
In summary, it is dear the initiatives started
with considcrable support und, as with most
initiatives, support naturally declined. This decline
can partially be attrihuted to the eampaign efforts
of Tax Payers for l'tah who wt'l'e ahle t.o oUlspend
the Tax Limilation Coalition by at least threc t.o
one, were able hI securc a plethora of elite and
media endorsements, and were very effective in
defining the issue.
Women Wl'n~ pa.-t.icularly
affected by the elli,,-t.s of lhis group. The reason
fin' lhis may perhaps be that women have a st.rong
matenlal inst.inct. alld as a result. responded with
great.cr (~(lIlvidion - against legislal ion t.hey thought
might aned lheir ehildren's educat.ion negat.ively.
Another more provable reason is that the campaign
I~I dereal the init.iatives was stalled by organizations
which were primarily fi'male and concentrated on the
women vot...·... OIH' 01" I hese organizat.ions, t.he PTA,
was probably the most elli'dive at rea"y influencing
Ihe pUhlic to dlange t.lwir minds al,oul the
init.iat.ives, espl'l"ia"y alllollg WOIlll'II.
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